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51.
Joseph W. Trefzger Peter F. Colwell 《The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics》1996,12(1):23-35
Governmental entities at all levels are empowered to acquire private property for the public's benefit, provided that just compensation is paid. The level of compensation typically viewed by courts as just is market value, but questions arise as to whether market value compensation motivates the private owner of land, potentially subject to a taking, to improve the property to a degree that is socially efficient. Earlier works have found market value to be a compensation level too high to promote efficiency. The present paper offers an analysis, based on a simple model of investor profit maximization, that provides a unified view of models presented in some important earlier works. In a special application of the general case, it is shown that market value can be too low a level of compensation to promote efficient behavior by the land owner. 相似文献
52.
管理层薪酬和持股激励效应的行业性差异分析--来自我国上市公司的实证证据 总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2
李玲 《中央财经大学学报》2006,(4):81-86
本文的研究以我国上市公司不同行业的实际数据为考察样本,运用实证分析方法验证我国上市公司不同类型行业管理层薪酬和持股与公司绩效之间的相关关系,分析结果表明:我国上市公司管理层薪酬和持股激励效应存在着较大的行业性差异,并提出不同行业企业应该根据自身特点和性质以及管理层薪酬和持股激励效应的大小,相机选择薪酬激励或股权激励,制定出详细周密、客观有效、切合实际的企业管理层激励方案,从而使其激励效应最大化。 相似文献
53.
Despite empirical research and theoretical validity, there is mixed evidence on whether employee stock options align interests between management and shareholders by turning managers into owners. What used to be a functional tool introduced in the 1950s, has gotten out of hand, as perceived by the press and popular literature. The main catalyst is the accounting treatment stock options receive. This paper provides an overview of the empirical research in the field and discusses the current accounting treatment of employee stock options and impending changes. We conclude by proposing alternative compensation tools. 相似文献
54.
This paper examines the joint impact of capital requirements and managerial incentive compensation on bank charter value and bank risk. Most of the previous literature in the area of banking and agency theory has focused on asymmetric information between either banks and regulators, (and therefore on the role of bank capital), or between bank shareholders and bank managers, (and therefore on the role of managerial ownership). In this paper we unify these issues and present empirical results from the regression of capital requirements jointly with measures of incentive compensation on Tobin's Q, our proxy for bank charter value, and on the standard deviation of total return, our proxy for bank risk. In a sample of 102 bank holding companies we find that capital levels are consistently a significant positive factor in determining bank charter value and a significant negative factor in determining risk. On the other hand, we find our six measures of incentive compensation to be generally insignificant relative to charter value but do provide some evidence consistent with a theory relating types of incentive compensation with risk. 相似文献
55.
This study investigates the impact of chief executive officers’ (CEO) compensation on their choices regarding the timing of earnings restatements. The results indicate a negative relationship between options exercised and lags in disclosing the restated earnings, suggesting that managers who exercise options in a given year tend to release information quickly. This effect is more pronounced if the options are exercised after the dark period. We also find that the market penalises longer lags in the restatement disclosure. It seems that the CEO would try to optimise the timing of information release so as to balance the costs and benefits. 相似文献
56.
在分析风险自留的内生逻辑基础上,进一步分析风险自留实现银行信用风险补偿的内在机理。研究表明:银保信贷系统通过对贷款企业个体风险与事先设定的平均代偿风险的匹配性甄别,实现对银行信用风险的分级补偿功能。针对银行超预期信用风险,先行实施银行风险拨备机制对银行平均代偿风险进行补偿,然后实施超额风险自留机制对超过平均代偿风险的银行超额风险部分再次进行补偿,超额风险自留补偿基金将由银行与担保机构依据各自的风险均衡配置阈值占比共同筹集,以此来实现银行信用风险分级补偿目标。并以此为依据,设计了银保信贷系统风险自留机制。 相似文献
57.
Built upon the agency theory and the stewardship theory, this study examines the mergers and acquisitions (M&A) activities among Chinese publicly listed firms. Using a founder-CEO indicator, we separate steward effects from agency effects, and find that Chinese firms’ M&A activities are significantly influenced by the steward factors after controlling for the agency factors. Firms, of which CEO is a founder, enjoy relatively higher premium during M&A. Further investigation reveals that the steward effects vary in the power of CEO. The results show that steward effect is reinforced when founder-CEO is more powerful. 相似文献
58.
本文以创业板上市公司为研究样本,从薪酬契约和代理成本的视角,检验了顾客集中与管理层治理的关系。实证分析结果显示,顾客集中度与高管薪酬和代理成本存在显著负相关关系。结果表明:顾客集中显著影响公司薪酬契约,顾客集中降低了高管薪酬;顾客集中降低代理成本,减轻管理层代理冲突问题。这些研究结论丰富了公司治理的理论内容,同时对于缓解公司代理冲突、改善公司治理矛盾具有重要的现实意义。 相似文献
59.
The board independence requirements enacted in conjunction with the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) provided motivation for firms that were already compliant with the regulations to alter their board structure. We consider actual board changes made by compliant firms and how such changes affect the monitoring efficiency of the boards. We find that the majority of compliant firms (approximately 56%) add independent directors following SOX. However, we find a nontrivial number of firms (approximately 26%) actually decrease the number of independent directors to move closer to the stated 50% requirement. For firms that decrease independence, the CEO turnover performance sensitivity significantly decreases following SOX. We also find that large board independence changes seem to be most detrimental to the monitoring function of the board. Our results highlight that SOX may have had unintended consequences. 相似文献
60.
Top management team incentive heterogeneity,strategic investment behavior,and performance: A contingency theory of incentive alignment 下载免费PDF全文
Adam L. Steinbach Tim R. Holcomb R. Michael Holmes Jr. Cynthia E. Devers Albert A. Cannella Jr. 《战略管理杂志》2017,38(8):1701-1720
Research summary : We develop and test a contingency theory of the influence of top management team (TMT) performance‐contingent incentives on manager–shareholder interest alignment. Our results support our theory by showing that although TMTs engage in significantly higher levels of acquisition investment when their average incentive levels increase, investors' responses to those large investments are generally negative. More importantly, however, we further find that within‐TMT incentive heterogeneity conditions that effect, such that investors evaluate TMTs' large acquisition investments more positively as the variance in those top managers' incentive values increases. Thus, within‐TMT incentive heterogeneity appears to increase manager–shareholder interest alignment, in the context of large acquisition investments. Managerial summary : We find that as the average value of TMTs' incentives increase, relative to their total pay, they invest more in acquisitions and investors' respond negatively to the announcement of those deals. However, we further show that investors respond more positively to acquisitions announced by TMTs whose members' incentive values vary (some TMT members hold higher incentives and others hold lower). Results imply that when TMT members hold differing incentives levels, they approach investments from divergent perspectives, scrutinize those investments more heavily, and make better decisions, relative to TMTs with similar incentives. They also suggest that boards seeking tighter manager–shareholder interest alignment may benefit from introducing variance into TMT members' incentive structures, as doing so appears to create divergent preferences that can improve team decision making. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 相似文献